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ABSTRACT
Federal circuit courts offer conflicting interpretations of
when an employee violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) by accessing an employer’s computer system
without authorization. Enacted originally as an anti-hacker
statute, the language of the CFAA proves ambiguous when
courts attempt to apply its sanctions to individuals given
access to a computer (such as an employee by an employer).
Circuit Courts have interpreted the statute differently,
generally applying one of two theories to reach their
interpretations: (1) agency theory; or (2) looking to the plain
language of the statute and the rule of lenity. These differing
interpretations have resulted in varying outcomes when
employers seek to sanction employees for violating the Act.
Employers face tough questions about when and how to seek
sanctions when employees potentially violate their rights of
computer access. This Article takes an in-depth look at the
varying interpretations among the circuits and considers a
number of district court cases and their application of the
CFAA.
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INTRODUCTION
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 1 both criminalizes
unauthorized access to certain private computer systems and allows
parties harmed by such access to bring civil actions for compensatory
damages and injunctive relief. With the growing use of computers by
employees at all levels, however, companies increasingly face the
loss of sensitive data through internal acts – violations by their own
workers. The language of the CFAA is ambiguous about whether the
Act should apply to these internal violators. Thus, federal circuits
have split on what it means to be without or to exceed authorized
access under the CFAA.
The principle interpretations come from the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits. 2 In International
Airport Centers L.L.C. v. Citrin, 3 the Seventh Circuit used agency
law to determine when authorization by an employee begins and
ends; under this interpretation, an employee violates the CFAA when
the agency relationship is severed and thus authorization is
constructively rescinded. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka 4 interpreted the statute according to its plain
language to determine when an employee lacks authorization. The
1

18 U.S.C. § 1030.
See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); LVRC
Holdings LLC, v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
3
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 423.
4
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134.
2
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Ninth Circuit finds a violation of the CFAA only when no
authorization has ever been given or when authorization has
affirmatively been rescinded by an employer. 5 For any employer
seeking damages or injunctive relief against a rogue employee, it will
be important to consider the branches of interpretation as well as the
many offshoots in each of the district courts. This Article examines
the Citrin and Brekka decisions and considers cases from the district
courts to determine how these varying analyses affect employers
faced with the threat of computer-system breaches.
I. THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE CFAA
The difficulty in interpretation of the CFAA arises from the origin
of the statute. Enacted in 1984 to help the federal government
prosecute computer crimes, Congress designed the CFAA to target
hackers who “break in” to systems. 6 But the CFAA has grown from
protecting only “federal interest computers” to guarding any
“protected computer.” 7 Further, the original incarnation was solely a
criminal statute, but the scope of the CFAA has gradually expanded
through legislative enhancements to include a private right of action. 8
That private action allows an individual to seek civil remedies when
he or she has suffered loss or damages as a result of someone else’s
improper access.
Section 1030 prohibits five categories of conduct: (1) theft of
computer data; (2) unauthorized access with intent to defraud;
5

Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135.
Fishman and McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping §26:1(2010); see
also Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining
Employees' Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 819, 820 (2009).
7
A “protected computer” is any computer “which is used in interstate or
foreign commerce or communication.” 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(2)(B) (West 2008). This
broad definition encompasses nearly every computer since any connection to the
internet satisfies this requirement; see Daniel J. Winters & John F. Costello, Jr., The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A new weapon in the trade secrets litigation
arena, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 2005), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252
%5C1002%5CISBA_IP_article.pdf.
8
Winters & Costello, supra note 5.
6
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(3) unauthorized access resulting in destruction; (4) trafficking in
computer passwords; and (5) extortion by threat of damage to a
computer.9 All but the fifth category contain the qualifying language
“without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access.” These two
phrases are the root of the dispute between the various circuits.
The CFAA states in relevant part that whoever “intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized
access, and thereby obtains … information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer … or contained in
a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer” commits a
federal crime. 10 Courts employ different methods in applying the
language of “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access”
to a computer.
Because the original purpose of the CFAA was to keep third
parties from illegally accessing others’ computers and information,
the language regarding authorization can be unclear when applied to
an employee who has been given a degree of authorization by the
employer. Courts have struggled to apply this anti-hacker statute
when the offender is not a third party but someone who has been
given access to the computer, such as an employee.
II. THE SPLIT BETWEEN CITRIN AND BREKKA
The circuit split centers on when employees have authorization to
access computer systems. The Seventh Circuit uses agency law to
define the boundaries of authorization. In Citrin, it held that when an
employee violates his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer,
all access authorization ceases. 11 The Ninth Circuit recently offered
an alternative interpretation of the same statutory language. 12 Using
the “plain language” of the CFAA, that court determined that the
CFAA has narrower parameters for what constitutes a violation. 13
District courts have varied in their application of the two
interpretations, with most following the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.
9

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
11
Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).
12
LVRC Holdings LLC, v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009).
13
Id.
10
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A. The Seventh Circuit and Agency Law
In Citrin, the Seventh Circuit applied agency theory to interpret
the vague language regarding authorization in the CFAA. 14 Citrin
was an employee of International Airport Centers (IAC), which
loaned Citrin a laptop for work. He decided to go into business for
himself, in breach of an employment contract. 15 Before departing,
Citrin deleted numerous files that implicated his intent to develop a
competing business using IAC’s data from his loaned laptop. Beyond
deleting the files, Citrin utilized a special program designed to
overwrite deleted files, thus making them unrecoverable. He had been
given access by IAC to the computer and to the files. IAC alleged the
deleted files implicated Citrin and that was why they were deleted.
The company sought civil remedies against Citrin under the CFAA
for accessing data without authorization and for wrongfully
transmitting information. 16
The Citrin court held that an employee’s authorization to access a
computer ends for purposes of the CFAA when the employee violates
her duty of loyalty to the employer. 17 Under agency theory, an
employee violates that duty when he or she determines to act
wrongfully or break loyalty (such as by taking another job) with the
employer. 18 The court determined that Citrin violated his fiduciary
duty of loyalty to IAC and therefore acted “without authorization” in
accessing the files. 19 This decision was the primary appellate
interpretation of the authorization language in the CFAA 20 until the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brekka.

14

Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
Id. at 419.
16
Id.
17
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.
18
Restatement (Third) of Agency, §8.01 (2006).
19
Id.
20
The First Circuit also considers the issue, but offers a similar interpretation
as the Seventh Circuit and the Citrin case is the one generally cited as the primary
authority. See Nick Akerman, Time to Review Corporate Computer Policies, NAT'L
L.J. (Feb. 3, 2010), http://computerfraud.us/files/2010/03/Time-to-ReviewComputer-Policies-v1.pdf .
15
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B. The Ninth Circuit and Plain Language Interpretation
In September 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided Brekka, another
case involving an employee’s improper use of company files. The
Ninth Circuit was “unpersuaded by [the] interpretation” of the
Seventh Circuit. 21 Instead, the court considered the plain language of
the statute and the rule of lenity for criminal or quasi-criminal
statutes. 22 LVRC Holdings employed Brekka to manage one of its
treatment facilities. As part of this position, Brekka received access to
the computer system and full access to any files or records. During
his employment, Brekka travelled between his work in Nevada and
his home in Florida. He often transmitted files between his work and
home computers. He eventually decided to start his own business and
dumped a number of files, including confidential information, from
his work computer to his home laptop. LVRC Holdings sought civil
damages against him for violation of the CFAA.
The Brekka court first noted that the CFAA is primarily a
criminal statute, although Brekka was a civil case, 23 and determined
that as a criminal statute the rule of lenity should be applied in
interpreting any ambiguity of language. 24 The rule of lenity mandates
that courts interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the
defendant in order to avoid unexpected burdens. 25 According to the
court, the “rule of lenity, which is rooted in considerations of notice,
requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes to the clear
import of their text and construe any ambiguity against the
government.” 26 The court specifically cited Citrin and stated that
applying agency theory in these cases would lead to confusion for
defendants because such an interpretation is not implied by the plain
language of the statute.27
21

Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134.
Id. at 1134-35.
23
The CFAA is a criminal statute, but it provides civil remedies in addition
to criminal penalties. Fishman and McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping
§26:1 (2010).
24
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1135(citing United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir.
2006)).
27
Id.
22
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The Brekka Court then considered the plain language of the
statute to determine the meaning of authorization.28 The court defined
“authorization” to access a company’s computer as “when the
employer gives the employee permission to use it.”29 The court
reasoned that the CFAA’s plain language says nothing about an
employee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty. Authorization begins and ends
with the employer, not the employee, under this view. An employee
acts without authorization only if the employer never gives
permission or affirmatively rescinds permission. The court
determined that Brekka was not liable under the CFAA because the
LVRC had authorized his access to the computer. In the court’s view,
this was not “without authorization” as the statute requires.
The court further opined that Brekka could not have violated the
CFAA under “exceeds authorized access” because he only accessed
the computer as the company had allowed. The CFAA addresses
access, not use, according to the Ninth Circuit. What the employee
does with materials after properly accessing them does not bring the
employee’s actions under the sanctions of the CFAA. 30
The Ninth Circuit is the first federal appellate court to apply this
reasoning. However, the Brekka Court’s rationale is not new. Prior to
the Brekka opinion, district courts had applied similar logic when
interpreting the terms “authorization” and “authorized access.”
The interpretations from the Citrin and Brekka decisions provide
the guideposts for other interpretations of the CFAA. Other circuits
have interpreted the statute similarly, with some minor variation. 31
28

Id.
Id. at 1133.
30
Id. at 1135.
31
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir.
2001)(supporting the Citrin analysis, but noting use of “scraper” program
“exceeded authorized access,” assuming program's speed and efficiency depended
on breach of confidentiality agreement with former employer); ReMedPar, Inc. v.
AllParts Medical, LLC, 683 F.Supp.2d 605, 613 (M.D.Tenn 2010)(following the
Brekka reasoning, but attaching legislative history analysis as well); Bro-tech Corp.
v. Thermax, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 378, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2009)(supporting the Brekka
reasoning, but noting that whether an employee who had deleted emails from his
company computer before discharge had exceeded authorized access is a question
of fact for a jury); Cenveo, Inc. v. Rao, 659 F. Supp. 2d 312, 317 (D. Conn.
2009)(stating transmission of confidential information via computer is not enough,
but can only exceed access if the information accessed was in the computer).
29
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The reasoning of Brekka has been more widely adopted and can be
found in district court cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. 32 Most of these apply an almost identical
analysis to that of the Brekka case, though the Second and Fourth
Circuits have slight variations. 33 In these cases, courts often find an
employee is without authorization only when he or she never received
access to particular data or systems. Once an employee receives
access to a system, an employer has little recourse under the Ninth
Circuit interpretation of “without authorization.”
C. Beyond Citrin and Brekka: The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’
Interpretations of the CFAA
Two circuit court decisions following Brekka further outline the
nuances of applying §1030(a)(2)(B), particularly to employees who
exceed authorized access. Both decisions highlight the importance of
the employee’s knowledge. The Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. John34 noted
that “an authorized computer user ‘has reason to know’ that he or she
is not authorized to access data or information in furtherance of a
criminally fraudulent scheme” and thus violates the CFAA by
acting. 35 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that notice to the employee of his
access limits could be dispositive in determining whether
authorization was exceeded. 36 Both decisions seem to distinguish,
rather than dispute, the holding in Brekka.
In John, the Fifth Circuit considered the “exceeds authorization”
language of the CFAA. 37 The court held that employers have broader
protections against rogue employees than under the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation. Unlike many of the other cases, the actions of the
32

Though this Article uses Brekka as a guidepost, many of the referenced
district court cases applied the same line of reasoning as Brekka prior to the Brekka
decision.
33
Cenveo, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (noting a distinction where accused did not
access information “in a computer”); Werner-Masuda, 390 F.Supp.2d at 499
(noting distinction where the act is unauthorized disclosure of information rather
than unauthorized access to information).
34
U.S. v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
35
John, 597 F.3d at 273.
36
United States v. Rodriguez, 628F.3d, 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010).
37
John, 597 F.3d at 273-73.
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employee in John were criminal both under the CFAA and separate
criminal fraud statutes. The employee accessed employer information
and bank account records and used the information to defraud
customers. Furthermore, the employer told the defendant that such
access was prohibited and beyond the scope of what was
authorized. 38 The court determined that the defendant’s access
exceeded authorization, stating that access “to a computer and data
that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the purposes
for which access has been given are exceeded.” 39
The Fifth Circuit drew an important distinction from the Brekka
case; the court noted that “the Ninth Circuit may have a different
view” on how it interpreted the “exceeds authorization” language. 40
In Brekka, the court had determined that if an employer had not
affirmatively rescinded authorization, an employee “would have no
reason to know” that personal use might also violate the CFAA. 41
The John court stated that in its case, the reasoning that the employee
“had no reason to know” did not apply. 42
The violator in John had not only accessed employer data but had
done so in “furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme.” 43 The
Fifth Circuit stated that “when an employee knows that the purpose
for which she is accessing information in a computer is both in
violation of an employer's policies and is part of an illegal scheme, it
would be ‘proper’ to conclude that such conduct ‘exceeds authorized
access’ within the meaning of § 1030(a)(2).” 44 This interpretation of
the phrase “exceeds authorized access” broadens the application of
the CFAA beyond what the Ninth Circuits and other courts apply, but
stops short of the employer-friendly holding in Citrin. Rather than
providing blanket protection for employees given access by the
employer, the Fifth Circuit imposes an important limitation on
employees who violate employer policies and do so as part of an
illegal act. This gives employers some remedies against gross
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273 (citing Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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violations by employees – even employees previously granted access
– but does not extend to employees who merely disregard the
employer’s expectation of loyalty.
The Eleventh Circuit decided in U.S. v. Rodriguez that notice to
the employee that accessing information, otherwise normally
authorized, outside the scope of normal business reasons was
prohibited met the plain language of the CFAA. 45 The employer,
Teleservice, had advised Rodriguez that accessing the personal
information databases was only authorized for business reasons. 46
Any access outside of that scope was prohibited. Furthermore,
Rodriguez readily admitted that he was aware of this policy and had
accessed “things that were not authorized.” 47
The court distinguishes its holding from both the Brekka and John
decisions. The court states that this case differs from Brekka in that
the employer there had not provided any such notice to the employee
regarding the prohibited access. 48 The court distinguishes John on the
grounds that Rodriguez’s lack of criminal use of the information (as
required by John), “is irrelevant if he obtained the information
without authorization or as a result of exceeding authorized access.”49
The court does not reach the John standard because, unlike in John,
Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access by violating a known
policy of the employer.
III. WHAT CAN EMPLOYERS DO? A LOOK AT
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Employers should be careful to consider whether an employee
acted without authorization or exceeded authorized access because
circuit courts interpret the terms of the CFAA differently. Courts that
follow the Citrin approach favor a broader acceptance of
contractually setting up boundaries for authorization, for instance
through confidentiality, employment, and noncompete agreements. In
jurisdictions following Citrin’s agency law approach, employers have
45
46
47
48
49

United States v. Rodriguez, 628F.3d, 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1263
Id.
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more power to set up the boundaries that they want individual
employees to follow. Specificity in employment agreements is not as
crucial because of the loyalty requirements under agency theory that
give employers a remedy regardless. But a best practice will be to
make employment agreements specific enough to outline employee
expectations of what could break the agency relationship. The more
important issue in determining liability is whether an employee acted
disloyally towards the employer or acted with wrongful purpose.
Under the Brekka analysis or similar interpretation, employers
should limit the access of lower-level employees and expand access
only when necessary. The larger question for employers under the
Brekka analysis is what to do with those employees that require
extensive access to data and systems. Those types of employees leave
employers most vulnerable to breaches of confidentiality and
noncompete agreements. Under Brekka, an employer’s recourse may
be limited under the CFAA. Even having confidentiality agreements,
employment agreements, and computer policies does not always save
employers in these circuits.
The John court sets forth a middle ground. An employer cannot
use the “without authorization” language of the CFAA as a sword to
parry employees already given access. But an employer may have
some remedies under “exceeds authorized access.” An employee who
uses information obtained from a computer system as part of a
criminal scheme when subject to a detailed employee computer-use
policy that states exactly when an employee exceeds access probably
violates the CFAA.
Rodriguez goes one step further, stating that a detailed policy by
the employer and a demonstration that the employee had knowledge
of that policy is enough to show access was not authorized or
exceeded authorization under the CFAA. Under those circumstances,
whether an employee planned to use the information as part of a
criminal scheme is irrelevant. Knowledge and violation of the
employer’s policy can be sufficient to demonstrate the employee
exceeded authorized access.
CONCLUSION
Employers should strive to limit computer access to employees
and to clearly communicate computer-use policies to those with
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access. The courts generally apply the CFAA in favor of employees.
However, some circuits are giving employers a fighting chance. The
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit rulings give more ground to employers.
The best defense for employers is not to rely on the CFAA as a
remedy but to limit access of employees to sensitive data and to be
clear about what those limits are through detailed policies, computeruse agreements, and records demonstrating employees’ knowledge of
those policies.

